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Abstract
It is an orthodoxy of modern political thought that violence is morally
incompatible with politics, with the important exception of the permissi-
ble violence carried out by the state. The “commonsense argument” for
permissible political violence denies this by extending the principles of
defensive ethics to the context of state-subject interaction. This article
has two aims: First, I critically investigate the commonsense argument
and its limits. I argue that the scope of permissions it licenses is signif-
icantly more limited than its proponents allow. Second, I develop an al-
ternative (and supplementary) framework for thinking about permissible
political violence. I argue that under certain circumstances, subjects may
violently protest their treatment, where protest is understood as an expres-
sion of rejection of those circumstances. On my view, protest, including
violent protest, is permissible when it is the fitting response to those cir-
cumstances. This alternative framework accounts for an important class of
cases of intuitively permissible political violence, including cases in which
such violence does not serve strategic political ends or is even counterpro-
ductive towards those ends.
1 Introduction
It is commonly held among politicians and the public alike that, as Weber
(1919/1994) wrote, the state possesses the “monopoly of the legitimate use of
force” within its territory. While Weber offered this as a definition of the mod-
ern state, it also captures what many take to be a moral principle prohibiting
the use of private violence toward political ends: in legitimate states, acts of vi-
olence by non-state actors in service of political ends are morally unacceptable.
In contemporary contexts, this principle is wielded particularly against those
engaged in riots, urban uprisings, and violent protest.
*My thanks to audiences at Harvard, Oxford, and the 2020 APSA Annual Conference for their
helpful comments on drafts of this paper. Special thanks to Danielle Allen, Arthur Applbaum, Eric
Beerbohm, James Brandt, Cécile Fabre, Liz Frazer, Ten-Herng Lai, Alexander Moon, Eric Nelson,
Michael Rosen, Tommie Shelby, and two anonymous referees for this journal.
1
This version of Weber’s dictum is so widely espoused across otherwise sig-
nificant dimensions of political difference that to call it an orthodoxy seems
appropriate. Indeed, it is the credo of leaders the world over. Here are just
some recent exemplars: Barack Obama,1 Donald Trump,2 Nicola Sturgeon,3
Emmanuel Macron,4 Carrie Lam,5 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,6 and the Spokesper-
son for the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights.7 What evidence there
is on broader attitudes towards violent protest, moreover, suggests that these
leaders’ statements reflect the views of a large part of the general public (Clif-
ford & Ferrell, 1992; Jackson et al., 2013; YouGov, 2020).
Like all good orthodoxies, however, this view has its apostates. Malcolm X
expressed the contrary view when he said:
If it must take violence to get the black man his human rights in this
country, I’m for violence exactly as you know the Irish, the Poles, or
Jews would be if they were flagrantly discriminated against. I am
just as they would be in that case, and they would be for violence—
no matter what the consequences, no matter who was hurt by the
violence. (1966, p. 374)
Importantly, Malcolm X held such acts of violence to be permitted as a matter
of right, not merely as costs outweighed in the final calculus by the good of
black liberation versus the bad of others’ lives lost.
Indeed, the Black Radical movement in the United States may represent the
most substantial articulation of this idea. Specifically, a central philosophical
theme of that movement has been that under circumstances of severe oppres-
sion, political violence is morally permitted as matter of self- (and other-) de-
fense—not only of lives and bodies, but of rights and freedoms as well. [See An-
gela Davis in Brown (1972); Newton (1971); Carmichael & Hamilton (1992);
Williams (1962); among many other examples.] This appeal to the framework
1“There is never an excuse for violence against police, or for those who would use this tragedy
as a cover for vandalism or looting” (Obama, 2015). (See also Obama, 2014.)
2“…we cannot allow the righteous cries and peaceful protesters to be drowned out by an angry
mob. The biggest victims of the rioting are peace-loving citizens in our poorest communities. And
as their president, I will fight to keep them safe. I will fight to protect you. I am your president of
law and order, and an ally of all peaceful protesters” (Trump, 2020).
3“Violent protest is never acceptable. … That is not acceptable behaviour at any time, but at
this time of crisis that the country faces, I think it’s particularly shameful behaviour” (Sturgeon
quoted in Wood, 2020)
4“No cause justifies that police be attacked; that shops be pillaged; that public or private build-
ings be burned; that passers-by or journalists be threatened; that the Arc de Triomphe be stained”
(“Expression sur les violences à Paris,” 2018).
5“[T]he extreme use of violence and vandalism by protesters … is something that we should
seriously condemn, because nothing is more important than the rule of law…” (Lam, 2019).
6“Those who demand freedom and democracy should also act democratically” (Erdoğan quoted
in Harding, 2013)—regarding violent protests in Istanbul’s Gezi Park by those Erdoğan called
“vandals.”
7“The resort to extreme violence—including against the police force—by some engaged in the
protests is … deeply regretted and cannot be condoned” (Colville, 2019).
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of defensive ethics has also lately been taken up by a number of academic polit-
ical philosophers (Brennan, 2018; Caney, 2015; Delmas, 2018, pp. 179–180;
Pasternak, 2019). It is, indeed, the foundation upon which those who reject
Weber’s orthodoxy have built their church.
And yet, I think the framework of defensive ethics is an unpromising one by
which to vindicate the full range of acts of intuitively justified violent resistance
to oppression. This is not to say that the principles of defensive ethics cannot
justify political violence; rather, it is to say that the scope of such acts which are
justified by those principles is much more severely limited than is commonly
acknowledged. The first aim of this paper is to point out and take stock of
some of these limitations.
The second aim of this paper is to sketch the contours of an alternative—or
more accurately, a supplement. Specifically, I’ll argue that violent resistance
to oppression may be understood as a form of protest against what I call the
“circumstances of futility”: roughly, the position of being forced by another
(such as the state) into a dilemma between resigning oneself to oppression and
fighting back against it without reasonable hope of success. My view is that
acts of protest, including acts of violence, are sometimes the fitting response to
such circumstances. When a response is fitting, it is (all else equal) permitted;
and when it is permitted, it is justified.
Understanding some forms of violent resistance as taking fit as their nor-
mative standard helps make sense of an important range of intuitively justified
acts of resistance which are not plausibly justified by their effectiveness toward
strategic ends. Indeed, my view can help us see why certain acts of resistance
may be justified even when they are strategically counterproductive. These
conclusions add an important normative dimension to recent scholarship on
the effectiveness of violent protest (Enos et al., 2019; Muñoz & Anduiza, 2019;
Simpson et al., 2018; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008; Wasow, 2020) as well as a
counterpoint to other work on the political morality of non-violence (Mantena,
2012, 2020).8
2 Self-defense and politics
We know that the state sometimes mistreats its subjects, including by impos-
ing undue violence on them. It wrongfully convicts and imprisons; it requires
some to risk their own lives and to take the lives of others fighting unjust
wars; it allows to die those whom it has a duty to save; it beats and some-
times kills those who have done nothing to warrant battery or death; and so
on. Sometimes these things happen because its agents abuse their offices, but
often enough they happen under the aegis of the law. The state qua state some-
times wrongfully violates those subject to it. When this happens, it is because
8It is worth emphasizing that at no point will I argue that individuals should commit acts of
political violence. I shall, however, argue that they may, morally speaking, do so, and I shall ask
what we should make of this fact. This paper thus accepts the maxim that violence should not be
part of politics but questions how we should understand and enact this maxim.
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the state treats its subjects in ways that go beyond what they have sufficient
reason to accept,9 or in other words because the limits of the law have been
reached.
One common response to such violations is to invoke the framework of
self-defense: According to what we may call the “commonsense argument” for
political violence, when the state wrongfully10 yet lawfully applies force or the
threat of force to a person in the enforcement of its laws, shemay defend herself
against it. That is to say, subjects may defend themselves against violations by
the state.
Briefly stated, the commonsense argument runs as follows:
1. People have defensive permissions to prevent themselves and others from
suffering wrongful harm, subject to the regulative principles of defensive
ethics;
2. These permissions apply between subjects and the state (and its agents);
3. The state’s permission to inflict or threaten harm against its subjects,
including through powers granted to its agents, is morally limited by the
reasons subjects have to accept enforcement of the law;
4. Such limits may in fact be met;
Therefore,
5. In those cases in which acts or threatened acts by the state and its agents
exceed these limits, people may exercise defensive permissions to pre-
vent these acts from taking place.
These defensive acts, like all defensive acts, may in many circumstances be
violent.
This argument is powerfully simple. It may also be quite radical.11 How-
9Throughout the paper, when I speak of a person’s reasons I mean her moral reasons. A person
has sufficient reason to accept enforcement of the law if the moral considerations favoring its
acceptance (including those arising from duties, benefits, and so on) outweigh or defeat the moral
considerations against accepting it.
10When I say ‘wrongfully,’ I mean this word in its purely moral sense, since by hypothesis those
invoking the commonsense argument believe their distinctively legal or political recourse to have
run out. Thus, while (for instance) both Cliven Bundy and Robert F. Williams may invoke the
commonsense argument to justify their threat of force against the state and its agents—Bundy
against the U.S. government’s administration of western grazing lands andWilliams against police-
sanctioned lynchings in the 1960’s American South—their claims need not rise and fall together,
since each claim depends on a further substantive moral claim about the limits of the law having
been met, which cannot be judged by any purely legal or political standard. Similar remarks apply
to my claims later in the paper about the justification of violent protest: such acts are called for
only when the limits of the law have been reached and so depend on the truth of substantive
moral claims about the law’s limits for their justification. I thank an anonymous reviewer for
encouraging me to clarify this point.
11Just how radical depends upon further commitments. At the extreme, Jason Brennan (2016,
2018) deploys a version of the argument to defend the thesis that there is no moral difference
between the conditions for defense against government agents and those against civilians. A less
radical view might take a certain commitment to the political, or the value of cooperative politics,
as a source of reasons for subjects to accept some acts of enforcement that would be unacceptable
in non-political contexts. (On the notion of a commitment to the political, see e.g. Adams (2018)
and, differently, Allen (2004) on democratic sacrifice.)
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ever, it is important to note that the argument does not depend upon a commit-
ment to the rejection of political obligation for its force or radicality. Rather,
the commonsense argument is compatible with the ‘some difference view’ of
political obligation: the view (or family of views) according to which the law
makes some difference—not none, and not all—to subjects’ moral reasons to do
as the law demands and to accept enforcement of it.12 Indeed, it is radical
precisely in that it may license violent resistance even while accepting a general
duty to obey the law.
3 Limitations
Despite its radical nature, the conclusion of the commonsense argument—that
violent defense is permitted when the limits of the law are reached—may ring
hollow to any subject actually facing undue violence at the hands of the state.
For very often, the exercise of defensive permissions in the face of the over-
whelming power of the state would be tragically futile. To violently resist
wrongful arrest, for instance, even if initially successful, may invite only fur-
ther and more serious acts of enforcement; and to violently escape wrongful
confinement may predictably lead only to further confinement, perhaps for
longer or in harsher conditions. This is true, moreover, not only for individ-
uals but for groups. Of course, sometimes collective resistance against the
state can be effective. But on many other occasions even organized resistance
would stand no chance against the police, national guard, the edifice of the
criminal justice system, or other institutions of the modern state. In this way,
the permissions licensed by the commonsense argument may be importantly
practically limited.
Defensive permissions are also subject to limitations arising from the reg-
ulatory principles of defensive ethics themselves—namely, the principles of
necessity, proportionality, and liability. It is generally thought that joint sat-
isfaction of these principles is a necessary condition on morally permissible
defensive action.13 Much of what follows in this section will discuss the man-
ner in which these principles interact with defensive permissions in the specific
context of state-subject interaction. They do so in a way that, I shall suggest,
is often deeply problematic. By undertaking acts which only reinforce its own
prior wrongful acts, the state can manipulate these limitations so as to defeat
subjects’ defensive permissions and thereby immunize itself from the prospect
of defensive action—or so I shall argue. These limitations, too, apply to cases
of collective defense just as they do to cases of individual defense.14 Indeed,
12I shall proceed here as though the some difference view is correct, although my conclusions of
course hold a fortiori for philosophical anarchists.
13How exactly these principles relate and combine is a matter of debate. See Coons & Weber
(2016) (including especially their introduction to that volume) for an overview of recent scholar-
ship.
14Caney (2015), Delmas (2018), and Pasternak (2019), for instance, discuss cases of collective
defense against the infringement of political rights, whereas Brennan (2018) discusses cases of
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I believe that such circumstances are not only possible but that they pervade
the realm of state-subject interaction. This is not merely regrettable; it is, I
believe, perverse.
3.1 Prudence
“The Talk” is a conversation had very widely between parents and their Black
(and especially male) children in the United States and elsewhere regarding
interactions with the police (Gandbhir & Foster, 2018; Hughes, 2014). Parents’
advice is simple: don’t talk back, take your hands out of your pockets, do what they
say, be very polite—no matter the conduct or attitudes of the police themselves.
“The Talk” is obviously not advice about the right way to interact, morally, with
agents of the state; nor is it about the moral permissions of subjects and limits
of rightful state action. It is advice about how not to get hurt, which is to say
advice about prudence.
The point is a general one. Subjects who would use their defensive permis-
sions to resist or escape the state may find themselves facing the threat of sub-
sequent harms or wrongs that are as great or greater than the harms or wrongs
their defensive acts are taken to avert. The state, having had its agents suffer
the consequences of a defensive act, may call in reinforcement, and so bring
greater force to bear; or, having had its laws’ sanction escaped, may attempt
to re-confine escapees, perhaps in harsher conditions or for longer periods. Of
course, if these subjects lack sufficient reason to accept their treatment by the
state, they will a fortiori lack sufficient reason to accept these further acts of en-
forcement and sanction. But it may nevertheless be predictable that the state
will act in these ways, and so as a matter of prudence it may be that very of-
ten subjects should not exercise the defensive permissions they possess—just
as victims of muggings often should agree to hand over what is demanded of
them despite their moral permission to refuse.
These reflections speak to a structural oddity to the limitation from pru-
dence, and to the other limitations we shall discuss, which I want to highlight:
The fact that these permissions are outweighed by prudential considerations
is made true by the further acts of the very entity against which the defensive
permissions are had. In this sense, the state controls the prudential concerns
which limit, practically speaking, the use of subjects’ defensive permissions
against it.
3.2 Necessity and proportionality
The necessity and proportionality principles are core regulatory principles of
defensive ethics. There is, moreover, as Lazar says, “a deep connection be-
tween necessity and proportionality” (2012, p. 17). The two principles work
in concert in determination of a defensive act’s permissibility.
individual defense. While the circumstances and details of these kinds of cases differ, the structure
of justification is common between them, and my discussion of the limitations of that structure
applies to both.
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The necessity principle requires that defensive acts be necessary in order to
avert the harm or wrong that grounds the corresponding defensive permission.
If an act is unnecessary, because doing nothing or doing less would suffice to
accomplish the same ends, then it is impermissible. If you threaten to kill
me, but I could avert your threat by (say) dissuading you or punching you,
then killing you could not be justified by the ethics of self-defense, because
it would be unnecessary. Similarly, if I could not avert your threat by (say)
merely punching you (because more than a punch would be necessary), then
I could not claim that punching you was necessary to avert your threat. The
necessity principle as it is usually understood thus places both upper and lower
bounds on permissible defensive action. Killing when assault would suffice is
an example of a violation of the upper bound. Mere assault when only killing
could succeed is an example of a violation of the lower bound. In other words,
the necessity principle restricts permissible acts to those that would be both
effective and at the same time least harmful.15
The proportionality principle requires us to compare the seriousness of a de-
fensive act against the seriousness of the harm or wrong it is to avert in order to
determine its permissibility, where the permissibility of the former is thought
to depend upon the magnitude of the latter.16 Often, though not strictly, this
means that the defensive act may be no more than roughly equivalently seri-
ous compared to the seriousness of the act averted. Thus, stabbing a person
in self-defense would be disproportionate if what were being defended against
were a pinch, a tickle, an insult, and so on.
What unites these principles is a concern with prohibiting gratuitous harm:
harm which is unnecessary or disproportionate to the achievement of one’s
defense. These principles practically limit the commonsense argument since,
very often, defensive acts against agents of the state will fail either to be nec-
essary, proportionate, or both. To see this, consider two cases:
Necessity failure: Poe, an agent of the state, wrongfully threatens
Vic’s life. Because Poe bears the resources of the state, she wields
far greater force than Vic, a law-abiding subject, ever could. Thus,
while Vic could attempt to fight back against Poe, she has no rea-
sonable chance of successfully averting Poe’s threat.
In this case, the necessity principle forbids Vic from fighting back (on defensive
grounds), since she could not hope to succeed. Her resistance could not be
effective.17 Very often, we might suppose, defensive acts against agents of the
state would be of this kind. For how often can one successfully resist arrest or
escape incarceration? Hopes for such outcomes are clearly slim.
15Considerations of risk and uncertainty are also relevant (see Lazar, 2012), though not for the
analysis here.
16I follow Suzanne Uniacke’s (2011) proposal that we discuss proportionality in terms of ‘seri-
ousness’ of the relevant comparands.
17Many wish to resist this conclusion because it delivers the wrong verdict in some important
cases. This presents a puzzle, however, rather than reason to reject the necessity principle. I
discuss this issue further in sec. 4.
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Now consider another case:
Proportionality failure: Imagine that Vic is stopped for a minor traffic
infraction but faces the prospect of assault and lengthy detention
or confinement. Assume that Vic lacks sufficient moral reason to
accept this treatment, thereby giving her a prima facie defensive per-
mission to resist it. If Poe is an agent of the state carrying a deadly
weapon which she might use should Vic attempt to resist arrest,
then to resist arrest might require lethally harming Poe.
In many (though not all) cases, the seriousness of Poe’s death would be sig-
nificantly greater than the seriousness of arrest faced by Vic—even when the
seriousness of arrest is very serious. When this is the case, the proportional-
ity principle prohibits Vic from defending herself against wrongful treatment,
since Poe’s death would therefore be disproportionate to the wrong faced by
Vic. That is, the defensive act which would be effective would not be propor-
tionate.18 This is owed not to the fact that Poe’s treatment is acceptable to
Vic (it is not), but rather to the stakes of engaging in defensive action against
well-protected and lethally armed agents of the state.
Again, that these limitations apply (when they do), and therefore that sub-
jects defensive permissions are defeated, is often made true by prior acts of the
same entity against whom a defensive permission would be had. Indeed, the
police and other enforcement agentsmay be said to arm themselves precisely in
order to limit the capacity of subjects to resist. The state thereby controls the
conditions under which subjects may permissibly defend themselves against
it.
3.3 Liability
It is widely agreed that at least part of what makes a defensive action permis-
sible has to do with certain features of the person against whom that action
will be taken—normally features arising from acts undertaken antecedently by
him—and the relation of those features to the claims we each have not to suf-
fer harm by others. Beyond this too-general statement there is controversy
(Frowe, 2014, ch. 4; McMahan, 2016; Quong, 2012; Renzo, 2017), though a
common more specific thought is that by bearing moral responsibility for, or
responsible control over, threatened or ongoing wrongful acts, one can lose
18Themoralmechanics of some cases of this kind aremore complex: if Poe escalates the encounter
such that she is culpably threatening Vic’s life, then Vic’s use of lethal force in order to defend
herself would be proportionate, since Vic would then be responding to a lethal threat. However,
this describes (I think) only a subset of the relevant cases. In addition, it is also widely thought
that even when an attacker culpably threatens a victim’s life, if the cost of compliance with the
threat is comparatively small, the victimmay nevertheless be forbidden from killing in self-defense.
To kill a mugger rather than give him a dollar, for instance, is often thought to be impermissible,
and so to kill a police officer rather than comply with her wrongful demands may in many cases
likewise be impermissible. On escalation, see David Rodin (2002, p. 134) and Christopher Finlay
(2015, pp. 69–72).
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one’s own standing to claim that one not be harmed in ways that would de-
fend against those acts. For instance, by wrongfully threatening your life, I
lose standing to claim that you not lethally harm me in self-defense. When
I lose standing in this way, we say that I am liable to defensive harm at your
hands or on your behalf.19
Now, I wish to call attention to a peculiar feature of liability in cases of
group agency, including cases of state action divided between and carried out
by multiple state agents. Think of a person who is wrongly imprisoned, be-
yond the limits of what she has reason to accept. Who bears responsibility
(and so liability) for this outcome? The state, yes, but which of its agents?
In many political and legal systems, there is a wide variety of candidates for
this assessment—from legislators who make laws, to elected and appointed
executives who manage the agencies that enforce the law and run confinement
facilities, to prosecutors who decide whom to bring charges of lawbreaking
against, to judges and jurors who determine legal guilt or innocence and sen-
tence those found guilty, to ground-level enforcement agents such as police and
guards who arrest and confine. However we distribute responsibility among
such agents, one thing is clear: some will bear greater responsibility than oth-
ers and so will bear greater liability than others on that basis.
And yet, those against whom violent resistance would be most effective are
in many cases those who seem to bear the least responsibility; and those who
seem to bear the greatest degree of responsibility may be those against whom
opportunities for resistance will be scarcest. To see this, it may help to fix on
a case:
Liability failure: Imagine that Vic has been sentenced to death for
a crime she did not commit and for which exculpatory evidence is
now available, yet the state’s judges and prosecutors refuse to con-
sider this evidence. Imagine that Vic’s only chance to avoid death
is to kill Poe, a guard at the prison at which she is being held, thus
enabling her to escape. Suppose however that Poe is neither aware
of Vic’s exculpatory evidence nor in a position to assess it if she
were.
It seems plausible in this case that Poe does not bear sufficient moral re-
sponsibility, and thus liability, for Vic’s fate so as to warrant her death as a
means of Vic’s defense. On the other hand, those who (perhaps) do bear such
liability are (most plausibly) the prosecutors and judges who pursue and order
Vic’s death despite the availability of evidence of her innocence, or perhaps
the legislators and executives whose laws these judicial agents carry out. Yet
19I shall make the further assumption in what follows that it is sensible to talk of the extent of a
person’s liability to defensive harm or wrong, and that there is a connection between the extent of
one’s liability and the extent of one’s moral responsibility. One might thus be liable to defensive
harm, but more or less so than some other also-liable person, or more or less so than one would
have been in other circumstances. The extent of one’s liability thus also affects the extent of the
harm or wrong that may be wielded defensively against one on that basis.
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defensive action against them, we can imagine, would be either unavailable or
ineffective in preventing Vic’s death.
Now, there are surely other cases in which ground-level enforcement agents
do bear sufficient moral responsibility so as to be liable to defensive harm,
and still other cases in which defensive harm against legislators, executives, or
jurists might indeed be effective. But a great many cases will be like the one
described above, in which, due to the diffuse nature of state agency, defensive
action could not meet both the constraints of liability and effectiveness. Again,
this would be not because the wrongful threat to Vic’s life is removed, but
rather simply because the structure of Vic’s interaction with the state renders
defensive action impermissible. Once again, moreover, this circumstance is
brought about by prior acts and decisions of the state itself.
3.4 Taking stock
The foregoing reflections suggest that the scope of permissions countenanced
by the commonsense argument is quite limited, since in the actual circum-
stances of politics, such permissions are often outweighed, as when limited by
prudence, or else are defeated, as when limited by the regulative principles of
defensive ethics.
What should we make of this? In a certain frame of mind, some might look
on this fact with an attitude of approval. After all, the point of politics, for many
theorists, is to organize and stabilize society, including through the use of force
(Hobbes, 1996 (on the standard reading); Plato, 2002; Weber, 1919/1994).
But we are here considering acts which are, by hypothesis, beyond the bounds
of what subjects have reason to accept at the hands of the state. Whatever we
think, we surely cannot approve of such acts.
Taking the opposite view, we might instead be led towards revolution.
When the state exceeds the bounds of rightful action, the social contract is
broken (or so we might think) and rebellion is permitted (e.g. Rousseau, 1913,
III(X); or on an alternative reading of Hobbes, as per Sreedhar, 2010). But
even if true, this fact may likewise ring hollow to anyone facing wrongdoing
at the hands of the state. For against many modern states, even organized
resistance is likely to be futile. Moreover, we should consider that some
violations by the state, while perhaps permitting a forceful response, may not
dissolve the bonds of government entirely.
Victims of state wrongdoingmay thus be left with a difficult choice between
accepting their fate and futile resistance. There is a tragic quality to this fact.
It is tragic when permissions to defend oneself are outweighed by prudential
considerations stemming from the predictable further conduct of one’s very
same aggressor. It is also tragic when one’s defensive permissions are defeated
by the structure of state-subject interaction rather than by the removal of the
threat that would ground the permission.
Yet these are not simply tragedies to be lamented; they are, instead, so-
cial circumstances brought about by the acts of others—in particular, by the
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state and its agents. That is, those against whom defensive permissions are or
would be had are at the same time those with the power to create and manipu-
late the circumstances that outweigh or defeat such permissions. This is not
only tragic; it is, I suggest, perverse. This perversity is itself, I suggest, morally
objectionable.
It is worth pausing to reflect on the nature of this perversity. What, more
precisely, is objectionable about it? It is not simply that individuals’ defensive
permissions are defeated, nor (when they are not defeated) that it would be
imprudent to exercise them, for in many other circumstances these outcomes
are not at all objectionable. Nor could our objection lie in the deep difficulty of
the choice faced by individuals in these cases—between futile resistance and
resignation—since many deeply difficult choices (including true moral dilem-
mas) are precisely tragic rather than objectionable.20
Instead, I think that the wrong is a particular kind of compound wrong
which lies in a victim’s having her recourse for a prior wrong foreclosed by the
very same actor responsible for the original offense. To place another into the
“circumstances of futility” in this way—that is, into facing the choice between
futile resistance and resignation—with respect to a wrong one is oneself already
responsible for is to express a profound and odious disregard for her. It is a way
of doubling down on wrongful conduct rather than treating one’s victim as a
holder of claims against such treatment. In interpersonal contexts, this is a
way of failing to treat others as fellow members of the moral community who
are owed respect and answerability. When the state does this to its subjects, it
similarly fails to treat them as being owed justification for the state’s rule over
them.21
20It might alternately be thought that the wrong lies in the state’s manipulation of subjects’ cir-
cumstances, or in its dominating them. For various reasons, however, I don’t think these are promis-
ing candidates either. Wrongful manipulation most plausibly necessitates intent, which may be
lacking in some state-subject interactions of the kind discussed above. Domination on the other
hand seems like too generic a wrong to capture what seems specifically objectionable about the
specific circumstances described here; and moreover, the precise nature of the wrong of domina-
tion remains somewhat opaque despite the great deal of research on the topic. I thank two referees
for calling my attention to these possibilities.
21This is similar to how Amia Srinivasan describes what she calls the ‘wrongness of affective
injustice’:
Affective injustice is a second-order injustice … the wrongness [of which] … lies
[] in the fact that it forces people, through no fault of their own, into profoundly
difficult normative conflicts—an invidious choice between improving one’s lot and
justified rage. (2018, pp. 135–136)
Her view, however, takes only faultlessness of the victim as necessary to generate an objection to
the dilemma she faces, whereas my view is that fault on the part of a wrongdoer is necessary, so
that the objection is not to the dilemma per se but to the act of the person who wrongfully forces
it upon one.
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4 Protest
Such perversity (like its sibling cruelty) sometimes calls for a response. The
question I shall take up now is what form that response may take, and whether
it may include violent acts. In what follows, I shall argue that the fitting response
to the perversities we have been discussing is protest, and that sometimes only
violent protest is adequate to the wrong protested.
To begin to see the justification for this view, consider the case of
Bully: Chet is a cruel schoolyard bully, who regularly shakes down
other children for their lunch money. Chet is much larger than the
other children, who have no hope of resisting his demands through
force of their own. Loren is one such schoolchild, who, for the
umpteenth time, faces Chet.
Suppose that this time, Loren is sick of giving up his lunch money, and he
is tempted to kick Chet in the shin. He is tempted not because this act will
scare Chet off, now or in the future; on the contrary, such an affront is likely
to only fan the flames of Chet’s rage. Loren also, let us suppose, rejects the
notion that Chet deserves some comeuppance, perhaps because he knows that
Chet’s home life is troubled and that this is likely the source of his bullying
ways. Nevertheless Loren feels pulled to say “no” to Chet, and to say so with
his kicking foot. May he?
As a matter of intuition, the answer seems clearly to be yes, but there is
a puzzle as to why that should be so. Since kicking Chet would be neither
effective, nor deterrent, nor deserved, the worry is that it is gratuitous. And
how could gratuitous harm be justified?22
This is a version of an old puzzle in defensive ethics to which there are few
satisfactory solutions. Most prominently, Statman (2008) suggests that one
may violently defend one’s honor in such circumstances; McMahan (2016) sug-
gests that one may violently defend one’s dignity; and Frowe (2016) suggests
that one may violently defend one’s moral standing. But these solutions apply
principles of self-defense to the defense of this other thing, honor or dignity or
standing, leading to the problem that the necessity, proportionality, and liabil-
ity principles constrain defense of that in familiar ways. For example, if Loren
may defend his honor by drawing himself up and gravely stating, “I do not
recognize your right to treat me in this manner!,” then the necessity principle
enjoins him from taking the more drastic measure of kicking Chet in the shin.
Similarly, if Loren’s plight is at the hands not of a single bully but of some net-
work of agentially dispersed bullying, then the liability principle might prevent
him from kicking the shins of the chump extracting his money, rather than, say,
the ringleader, if only the latter would effectively defend his honor. It may also
prohibit Loren from kicking several such bullies, if they were attacking in a
22I adapt the arguments in this section from my “Futile Resistance as Protest” (2020), which
develops them at greater length and in greater detail with respect to interpersonal cases and the
defensive ethics literature.
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group, should kicking just one suffice to preserve his honor. These prohibi-
tions fly in the face of clear intuitions about these various cases.
These objections to the honor-, dignity-, and standing-defense views take
on greater force when we imagine much more serious cases: think of victims
of rape, individuals beaten by groups of assailants, slaves in revolt, or small
countries invaded by large aggressors. All of these cases seem to license per-
missions to futile resistance. Yet I doubt very much that such resistance, when
it could not be effective, is nevertheless constrained in the ways that would fol-
low from the view that what such resistance defends is honor or dignity or
standing. These people are not defending those things, if indeed they are de-
fending anything at all. They are fighting for their bodies and their lives and
their countries23—and they do these things permissibly, even when they have
no hope of success. And so the question remains, why should this be so?
We should, I believe, look elsewhere for an explanation of why such acts
are both justified and non-gratuitious. Here is what I suggest instead: futile
violence may be justified in protest of being placed by another—in our case, the
state—into the circumstances of futility. Importantly, this is not to say that
protest is called for in response to futility itself: as discussed already, some
futile circumstances may be simply tragic. Rather, it is the special wrong of
being forced into the circumstances of futility by one’s very same aggressor to
which protest is the fitting response.
What makes protest the fitting response to such wrongs? My answer will
become clearer in what follows; however, the basic thought is clear enough:
When we consider what makes these wrongs special—the profound and odi-
ous disregard wrongdoers express for their victims’ basic moral and political
claims—it becomes apparent that the fitting response is to reject the content
of this expression and thereby to insist upon one’s status as a holder of such
claims, or in other words as one entitled to moral and political regard.
4.1 Expressing rejection
The idea that futile violence may be justified as a form of fitting protest de-
mands a conception of protest. In a classic article on the topic, Bernard Boxill
offers a suggestion:
… when a person protests his wrongs, he expresses a righteous and
self-respecting concern for himself. (1976, p. 61)
Now, one thing about which Boxill seems surely correct is that protest involves
expression. Archetypal cases of protest are exactly that, and even private acts of
protest can express something to one’s own self. Indeed, I am inclined to think
that expression is an essential part of protest.
I also think, as Boxill subsequently argues, that an important aim and good
of protest can be to provide victims with evidence and secure knowledge of
23Frederick Douglass relevantly writes, “when I was looking for the blow about to be inflicted
upon my head, I was not thinking of my liberty; it was my life” (1855, p. 411).
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their own self-respect (1976, p. 67). But contra Boxill, I do not think such an
aim or good is essential to the justification of the practice—or indeed to the
practice itself. If it were, it is not obvious thatmany ordinary cases of protest on
others’ behalf would make sense, since one cannot normally, through an act of
protest, provide anotherwith evidence of her own self-respect. More importantly,
if insistence upon one’s own self-respect were an essential part of protest, then
protest might fail to be called for should one already possesses a secure sense
of one’s own worth. This seems especially the case when we consider violent
protest. If securing a victim’s self-respect were an essential end of protest,
but if a victim were already secure in her self-worth, then how could violence
toward that end be justified? Would it not, again, be simply gratuitous? Yet,
other things equal, futile defense in cases of rape, slavery, invasion, and so
on seems to me to be always permissible, regardless of the self-respect of the
victim.24
Boxill recognizes in one way the difficulty about effectiveness and observes
that protest seems called for precisely when there is no hope that the wrong
protested will abate. “Typically,” he writes, “people protest when the time for
argument and persuasion is past.” Protest is a response, indeed, to this fact:
Protest is, essentially, an affirmation that a victim of injury has
rights. It is not an argument for that position. (1976, p. 63)
Again, a point about which Boxill seems clearly correct is that although protest
is essentially expressive, it need not at the same time take the form of persua-
sion. In other words, protest is not necessarily an appeal to others. Thus, while
an important aim of some protest may be to address others—one’s compatri-
ots, the wider world, or indeed one’s own oppressors—it need not have that
aim. It is not a condition on permissible protest that it work to engender em-
pathy or sympathy in others, a point important to remember when considering
violent protest.
Boxill is also right to note that one thing an expressive act of protest may
accomplish is to affirm or insist upon the rights or dignity of the victim. But
while these may be important ends of protest, I think the more basic expressive
aim of protest is purely negative: it is simply rejection—of the circumstances
of one’s oppression, of acts of injustice, of the position in which one finds
oneself at the hands of others, and perhaps too of the cruelty or perversity of
these things.25
Here is what I propose instead. According to the
24For reasons of space, I can only treat Boxill’s argument here cursorily. See Shelby (2010) for
further (friendly) criticism of the view.
25This should be qualified. I shall argue in the next subsection that an expression of rejection is
the fitting response to many wrongs, and I argue here that such expression is what protest most
basically is. Now, when one expresses rejection of one’s wrongs, one may also thereby inevitably
also affirm or insist upon one’s rights or dignity. Whether, if so, this makes such affirmation or
insistence an essential part of protest is something about which I take no particular stand. I do
claim however that protest is not justified by any independent value such affirmation or insistence
may realize.
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Rejection Conception of Protest: Protest is an essentially expressive
act of rejection of what are taken to be unjust or wrongful circum-
stances, directed at (though not necessarily addressed to) the agent
taken to have responsible control over those circumstances.
To return to our earlier example, when Loren kicks Chet in the shin, Loren is
saying “no”—that he rejects what in this instance he is being forced to accept:
giving over his lunch money. His rejection is of the circumstances of futility in
which he finds himself, and his rejection is directed at Chet, because it is Chet
who is responsible for the creation and maintenance of those circumstances.26
4.2 Justification and fit
Because the conception of protest I have proposed does not essentially involve
the achievement of some end (except the expression rejection itself), it may
be mysterious what justifies it. Of course, merely saying “no” may need no
justification. But expression may take more active and forceful forms: a stomp
of the foot, a kick to the shins, and so on. Some of these acts may involve costs
to others. What justifies these sorts of expressive acts, including acts of violent
protest?
My further suggestion is that what justifies an instance of protest is not
the fact that it is a necessary means to some end but rather its fittingness as a
response to the circumstance of futility. When violent protest is justified, it
is because only such a forceful expression of rejection would adequately fit the
circumstances.
The fitting is a well-known (if under-theorized) normative category, and
while I shall rely on it here, I’ll not offer or endorse a particular analysis of it.27
Here is the basic idea, however: to be fitting is to be apt, adequate, called for,
correct, appropriate, and other synonyms; and for an expression (say) of protest
to be any of these things is for there to be the right sort of connection between the
expression of protest and the thing protested, regardless, importantly, of con-
siderations of efficacy and consequence. The notion is familiar from philosoph-
ical work on emotions and reactive attitudes: anger and resentment may be apt
in response to some circumstances but not others (Callard, 2019; D’Arms & Ja-
cobson, 2000; Langton, 2001; Srinivasan, 2018), as may blame (Owens, 2012,
chs. 1-2; Scanlon, 2008, ch. 4). It has figured in discussions of punishment,
where certain forms of punishment have long been thought to fit certain crimes
(Enker, 1991). Slightly farther afield, it also figures prominently in certain ar-
eas of normative ethics and meta-ethics—in debates regarding the correct anal-
26Juliette Hooker similarly analyzes riots/uprisings as “appropriate” forms of expression of anger
and pain (2016, pp. 462–464). Her claim however is that in democratic societies, permissions for
such expressions are owed as a form of civic redress for undue sacrifice, and moreover she is not
using “appropriate” in its fittingness sense. Her claims therefore differ in several ways from my
claims below about what justifies protest. Delmas (2018) and Pasternak (2019), drawing upon
Srinivasan (2018), both also suggest that acts of resistance may be apt responses to oppression.
In my discussion, I aim to offer an account that goes substantially beyond those suggestions.
27See Howard (2018) for a survey of approaches to the topic.
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ysis of value (Jacobson, 2011), in the related “wrong kind of reason” literature
(Hieronymi, 2005), and in debates about normative fundamentality (Howard,
2019; McHugh & Way, 2016).
The idea that the normative standard for expression is one of fit is also a
familiar one (Anderson & Pildes, 2000, p. 1512), as is the idea that acts may
carry a principally expressive dimension (Austin, 1975, p. 118; Langton, 1993,
p. 322). Together, these ideas suggest that fit provides the normative standard
for expressive acts—or at least for the expressive dimension of such acts. If
protest is an essentially expressive act, then its expressive dimension should
be governed by a standard of fit. It would seem to follow that an expressive
act is justified, in at least its expressive dimension, when and because it is
fitting. The conclusion is that protest is justified when and because it is a
fitting expression of rejection of the circumstances it responds to.
However, understanding protest as a fitting act of expression of rejection
only takes us part of the way. Since the particular expression of rejection we
are considering involves consequences, we need further standards for their jus-
tification. Why, we might ask again, may Loren say no with his kicking foot,
rather than only with his voice? Why (and when) is violent protest justified?
The answer is that unlike defense and other efficacy-oriented acts, the ori-
entation of expression, and so of expressive acts, is toward adequacy. Indeed,
adequacy is a central dimension of fit. (For example, when we deem blame of
the blameworthy to be called for, we mean that it is called for in the correct mea-
sure,28 or in other words that it must be adequate.) Thus, for an act of protest,
for instance, to be fitting is for it to adequately express rejection of the wrong
it responds to.
Now, while adequacy does require a certain kind of effectiveness—you can
only adequately express yourself if you successfully express yourself—it may
sometimes also require quite a bit more than this. For just as adequately ex-
pressing your thanks may, when the debt of gratitude is great enough, require
more than uttering “thank you,” so too may adequately expressing rejection
require more than uttering the word “no.” Indeed, in both cases, sometimes
words may fail entirely, such that expressive acts are called for instead. In cases
of protest, when the wrong to which it responds is serious enough, forceful
expression—including forceful or violent expressive acts—may be demanded.
This is why fitting protest may demand that Loren do more than say “no,” and
indeed do more even than shout it. For when the circumstances are severe
enough, it may be that only a kick will do.29
28There is some question, which I take no stand on here, about whether fittingness is itself
gradable–e.g. blame is more fitting in serious cases—or whether the fittingness of an attitude de-
pends on its gradation—e.g. only strong blame would be fitting (see Maguire, 2018, pp. 790–794).
The matter of adequacy as a dimension of fit, it seems to me, is indifferent between these alterna-
tives.
29If adequate expression of rejection sometimes demands violent protest, is non-violence ren-
dered impermissible on those occasions? This would contradict the very widely-held view that
non-violence is always at least permitted. But to be called for or demanded as a matter of fit is
not to be required. Since violence in such cases is not required, non-violence remains permitted.
(For example, to blame the blameworthy, while certainly called for, does not seem to be required;
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Despite the general nature of this claim, it is important to emphasize that
violence will not be demanded in response to any or every serious political
wrong. For my claim is not the old retributivist saw that violence is (simply)
the fitting response to serious wrongs. Rather, my claim is that violencemay be
the only way to adequately express rejection of wrongs which cannot be averted
and which themselves express the most serious disregard for their victims’
basic moral and political claims. This kind of disregard calls for an expression
of rejection; and when words fail, violence can be an important—and indeed
sometimes the only—way of raising one’s voice.30 When one is being well and
truly trampled upon by another, and when one’s complaints fall on deaf ears, it
is fitting to thrust one’s fist out in protest even if the boot will nevertheless fall.
In so doing, one rejects the other’s disregard for oneself, and one also thereby
insists upon one’s status as a holder of claims and as one owed respect and
answerability.
Although violent acts of protest may be called for in response to certain
forms of oppression, they are nevertheless subject to internal limitations simi-
lar to those limiting defensive acts. This is because fitting responses generally
(including therefore acts of fitting protest) must, as with acts of defense, obey
constraints of proportionality and liability. Only a proportionate response is a
fitting response; and a response is fitting only if it is directed at a target who
is liable to face it.
It is easy to see how certain expressive harms, such as those involved in
violent protest, might be proportionate (or not) to certain wrongs and injus-
tices. For instance, for Loren to stab Chet through the hand with a freshly
sharpened pencil may (or may not) be disproportionate to Chet’s bullying, de-
pending on the nature and extent of the abuse. Or, to take an example from
politics, for Black Americans in the 1960s to engage in rioting, destroying pub-
lic and private property and endangering the lives of public servants attempting
to enforce order, may (or may not) have been proportionate to the conditions
of economic and social ghettoization and subordination imposed on them.
It is also easy to see how considerations of liability bear on the justification
of acts of violent protest. For Loren to kick Sally, Chet’s younger sister, rather
than Chet himself, would be to place the burden of the consequences of this
form of protest on the wrong party, so violating the requirement of liability.31
Likewise, for rioters in Detroit’s Uprising of 1967 to have looted shops and
burned buildings across the Detroit River in Windsor, Ontario, rather than in
Detroit itself, would have been to impose the costs of this protest on those
who were (presumably) not liable to bear them. Had those riots taken this
magnanimity remains permitted.) See again my “Futile Resistance as Protest” (2020) for further
remarks on this question.
30King famously called riots “the language of the unheard” (1967), and David Carter, summa-
rizing contemporaneous accounts and interviews with participants in the Stonewall riots, charac-
terizes those events as a “collective crie de coeur” (2013, p. 160).
31The apparent permissibility of forms of protest that involve harm to oneself, such as hunger
strikes, self-immolation, and so on, suggest that the liability constraint confers upon those who
are not liable a waivable claim against suffering the consequences of protest.
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form, they could not therefore have been justified as instances of permissible
violent protest.
Note however that because the constraints of proportionality and liability
here are independent of the requirement of efficacy, they are more permissive
than in cases of defensive action.32 For instance, if (let us imagine) violent
protest by prisoners is a fitting response to certain circumstances of incarcer-
ation, and if guards are liable subjects of such violence, then violence against
them may be permitted as a matter of protest even though it is prohibited as a
form of defense. Since the goal of such protest is expression rather than defense,
it would not matter if such violence could not hope to help the protesting pris-
oners escape, or even if it were counterproductive.33 Similarly, if in democratic
societies citizens are complicit in the wrongs done in their names (Beerbohm,
2012; Stilz, 2011; Zakaras, 2018; though see also Lawford-Smith, 2019), they
too may be liable to suffer the consequences of fitting violent protest. Indeed, I
suspect we should think of many political uprisings as (in part) precisely such
activities.
4.3 Summary
We can now state the argument in summary:
1. Protest is an expression of rejection of wrongful or unjust circumstances;
2. Expression of rejection is a fitting response to some such circumstances;
3. A fitting response to an act or circumstances is (all else equal) permissi-
ble;
4. A response is fitting only if it is adequate, proportionate and correctly
directed (i.e. meeting the constraints of liability);
Therefore,
5. Fitting—i.e. adequate, proportionate, and correctly directed—protest is
(all else equal) a permissible response to some wrongful or unjust cir-
cumstances.
The circumstances in question are, I have argued, those that communicate a
profound disregard for the basic moral or political claims of those affected.
In practice, I suggested that such disregard arises in what I called the “circum-
stances of futility”: when individuals have their recourse for serious wrongs ob-
viated by the same actor responsible for the original offense, and so are forced
to choose between futile resistance and resignation to the wrongs done them.
Protest is the fitting response to these circumstances because it correctly ex-
presses rejection of this disregard. It also thereby insists upon victims’ status
32To be precise (and as noted above), permissible protest must be effective qua expression, but
it need not be effective as a means of averting the wrong protested in the way that, by comparison,
permissible defensive action must be effective as a means of achieving a defensive aim.
33The ineffectiveness or counterproductivity of violencemay of coursematter on other grounds—
morally, prudentially, or strategically, for instance.
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as holders of basic moral and political claims, owed regard and answerability.
Sometimes, only forceful or violent acts of protest can adequately express re-
jection of this kind of disregard.
We might wonder, finally, whether the kind of permission yielded by this
argument amounts to a moral right to violent resistance of the kind asserted
by Malcolm X in the passage quoted at the beginning of this paper. May the
oppressed resist their oppressors come what may—“no matter what the conse-
quences, no matter who was hurt by the violence?” The answer to this ques-
tion is not straightforward. This is, first, because the deontic status of fitting
responses is a matter of ongoing debate and research. (Do we have a right
to blame the blameworthy? Perhaps, but not clearly so. No matter what the
consequences? Probably not.) Second, this is because of complexities in rights
theories themselves. For one to have a right to 𝜙 is not necessarily for 𝜙-ing to
be permissible come what may. Even rights must, on most views, be sensitive
to considerations of consequence. The point, it seems to me, is not whether
or in what sense the permission yielded by this argument amounts to a right;
rather, that it yields a moral permission seems to me point enough. That by itself
suffices to contradict Weber’s Orthodoxy.
5 Conclusion
By way of concluding, it is worth reflecting on some implications of this view
for the kinds of actual political circumstances that have lain only in the back-
ground of this discussion.
Suppose arguendo (as many firmly believe, e.g. Alexander (2010); Davis
(2011)) that the practice of mass incarceration as it exists in the United States
today is grossly unjust. The commonsense argument, grounded as it is in de-
fensive ethics, might license prison breaks in such circumstances, either by
inmates themselves or by their allies outside, if such attempts could succeed.
But suppose that the power of the state would render any such attempt futile.
This is, I have suggested, deeply perverse: the futility of the exercise of these
defensive permissions is under the control of the very same agents against
whom such permissions are, or would be, had. This is like being told that
harming one’s kidnapper to escape his home is morally forbidden because he
has just built a fence to guard against just such an outcome. In light of the
perversity of this further circumstance, the argument from the permissibility
of violent protest nevertheless licenses further action. The kind of action that
is licensed is constrained, yet it seems to me that the range of options available
may nevertheless be very wide. First, consider the constraint of proportionality.
Depending on how we imagine the injustice we are considering, proportional-
ity may be very permissive indeed, ranging from civic disruption to destruction
of property to the risking of lives. Wrongful confinement, after all, is a very se-
rious injustice. Second, consider the constraint of liability. The range of those
liable to suffer the effects of acts of protest against such circumstances—that is,
people with responsible control of the circumstances of injustice—may also be
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very wide (though the extent of any particular individual’s liability is affected by
the extent of her responsibility andmay remain small). In democratic societies,
such individuals plausibly include citizens, as those with ultimate control of
the laws and policies of society and, relatedly, perhaps as agents complicit in
wrongs committed in their names. More clearly, those liable plausibly include
lawmakers and policymakers themselves, as well as those who execute their
laws and policies.
Whether mass incarceration, in particular, represents an injustice of the
kind I have just described is a question that could not be settled here, of course.
But we can confidently claim that injustices of this kind and magnitude have
existed in recent memory, and we can very plausibly claim that such injustices
continue to exist in various forms and places throughout the world, including
in liberal democratic societies. We must consider, then, how often people pos-
sess moral permissions to enact violent protest against these injustices—much
more often, I suggest, than we commonly allow—and how we, as individuals
and as societies, should respond to this fact.
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